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Introduction
In [31] Kraus Lehmann and Magidor (henceforth KLM) proposed an axiomatic approach to nonmonotonic reasoning based on the notion of plausible inference. Plausible inferences are represented by conditionals of the form A | ∼ B, to be read as "typically or normally A entails B". For instance, the conditional assertion monday | ∼ go_work can be used in order to represent that "normally if it is Monday I go to work". Conditional entailment is nonmonotonic since from A | ∼ B one cannot derive A ∧ C | ∼ B, in our example from monday | ∼ go_work one cannot monotonically derive monday ∧ ill | ∼ go_work ("normally if it is Monday, even if I am ill I go to work").
KLM presented a hierarchy of axiomatic systems for plausible inference, each system specifies a set of postulates characterizing plausible inference. The systems are, from the weakest to the strongest: cumulative logic C, loop-cumulative logic CL, and most important preferential logic P. In subsequent work [33] preferential logic was strengthened to rational logic R and the latter was proposed as the most adequate system to represent (nonmonotonic) plausible inference.
Although it is arguable whether, KLM systems, and in particular R, represent adequately all types of nonmonotonic inferences, 1 we think that KLM systems and the strongest R in particular, are still a significant proposal for nonmonotonic reasoning for two reasons: (a) on a theoretical level, they define a set of inferential properties which are useful (even if not necessarily wanted) to classify and analyze concrete nonmonotonic inference, (b) they provide a simple and direct language to express plausible inferences and to reason about them. In this work we take KLM logic R as the basis of our approach to nonmonotonic reasoning. Even if R formalizes some properties of nonmonotonic inference it is too weak in itself to perform useful nonmonotonic inferences.
We have just seen that by the nonmonotonicity of | ∼, A | ∼ B does not entail A ∧ C | ∼ B (monday | ∼ go_work does not entail monday ∧ ill | ∼ go_work), and this is a wanted property of | ∼: it is what allows to express sets of conditionals that in classical logic would lead to contradictory or absurd conclusions (for instance {monday → go_work, monday ∧ ill → ¬go_work} gives ¬(monday ∧ ill) in classical logic, that is that it is impossible to be ill on Monday). However, there are cases in which, in the absence of information to the contrary, we would like to be able to tentatively infer that also A ∧ C | ∼ B, with the possibility of withdrawing the inference in case we discovered that it is inconsistent. For instance, we might want to infer that A ∧ C | ∼ B when C is irrelevant with respect to the property B: in the example, we might want to tentatively infer from monday | ∼ go_work ("normally if it is Monday, I go to work") that monday ∧ shines | ∼ go_work ("normally if it is Monday, even if the sun shines I go to work"), with the possibility of withdrawing the conclusion if we discovered that indeed the sun shining prevents from going to work. R cannot handle irrelevant information in conditionals, and the inferences just exemplified are not supported.
Partially motivated by this weakness, Lehmann and Magidor have proposed a true nonmonotonic mechanism on the top of R. Rational closure [33] on the one hand preserves the properties of R, on the other hand it allows to perform some truthful nonmonotonic inferences, like the one just mentioned (monday ∧ shines | ∼ go_work). In [33] the authors give a syntactic procedure to calculate the set of conditionals entailed by the rational closure as well as a quite complex semantic construction. It is worth noticing that a strongly related construction has been proposed by Pearl [38] with his notion of 1-entailment, originating from a probabilistic interpretation of conditionals within the well-established System Z.
In this paper we provide a semantic reconstruction of rational closure for propositional logic as well as for Description
Logics (DLs for short) with a specific attention to the standard ALC. We first consider rational closure as defined by Lehman and Magidor [33] for propositional logic, and we provide a semantic characterization based on a minimal models mechanism on rational models. Then we extend the whole formalism and semantics to Description Logics: we first naturally adapt to DLs Lehman and Magidor's propositional rational closure, starting from an extension of ALC with a typicality operator T that selects the most typical instances of a concept C (the extension is called ALC + T R ). For ALC + T R , we provide both a syntactic and a semantical notion of rational closure, along the same lines used for the propositional case: we first define rational closure over the TBox, and subsequently rational closure for the ABox.
The first problem we tackle in this work is that of giving a purely semantical characterization of the syntactic notion of rational closure. Our semantic characterization has as its main ingredient the modal semantics of logic R, over which we build a minimal models' mechanism, based on the minimization of the rank of worlds. Intuitively, we prefer the models that minimize the rank of domain elements: the lower the rank of a world, the more normal (or less exceptional) is the world and our minimization corresponds intuitively to the idea of minimizing less-normal or less-plausible worlds (or maximizing most plausible ones). We show that a semantic reconstruction of rational closure can be obtained as a specific instance of a general semantic framework for nonmonotonic reasoning. Within this general framework we give two characterizations of rational closure: one based on a fixed interpretations semantics and the other with a variable interpretations semantics.
The theoretical question we address in this first part of the paper is the following:
A) Given the fact that logic R is characterized by a specific class of Kripke models, what are the Kripke models that characterize the rational closure of a set of positive conditionals?
We notice in passim that our semantic characterization of rational closure in terms of minimal models is different from the one given by Lehmann and Magidor's in [33] which is based on a different notion of minimal models. Moreover we consider our semantic characterization as a specific case of a general minimal models' mechanism for nonmonotonic reasoning, and in this paper we show under what conditions we capture rational closure. The generality of our semantical characterization is well-suited to study variants of rational closure. Finally, the semantic characterization does also easily extend to other logics, as Description Logics (ALC), that we discuss next. In the second part of the paper we consider Description Logics. If propositional KLM systems deal with propositions ("I go to work") and relations among propositions ("usually, if it is Monday, then I go to work"), Description Logics deal with concepts, relations among concepts, as well as with individuals. In Description Logics one can use concept inclusion in order to express that all the members of a class have a given property (thus Cats ⊑ Mammal expresses the general property that "cats are mammals", and Pet ⊑ ∃HasOwner.⊤ that "all pets have an owner"). One can also use assertions in order to represent the fact that an individual has a given property, e.g. Cat(tom) ("Tom is a cat") or ∃HasOwner.⊤(tom) ("Tom has an owner") or HasOwner(tom, nadeem) ("Nadeem is Tom's owner"). A distinguishing quality of Description Logics is their controlled complexity: the trade-off bethe cumulativity postulate of the weakest logic C. Of course, a nonmonotonic mechanism may give rise to different inference relations (skeptical, credulous, etc.) with different properties. Last, we tackle the problem of extending rational closure to ABox reasoning: in order to ascribe typical properties to individuals, we maximize the typicality of an individual. This is done by minimizing its rank (that is, its level of exceptionality). As we will see, because of the interaction between individuals (due to roles) it is not possible to separately assign a unique minimal rank to each individual and alternative minimal ranks must be considered. We end up with a kind of skeptical inference with respect to the ABox.
The rational closure construction we propose for ALC has not just a theoretical interest and a simple minimal model semantics. We show that it retains the same complexity of the underlying description logic. For ALC, the problem of deciding whether a typical inclusion belongs to the rational closure of the TBox is in ExpTime as well as the problem of deciding whether an assertion C (a) belongs to the rational closure of the knowledge base over the ABox. In this respect, the proposed approach is less complex than other approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in DLs such as [23, 2] and comparable in complexity with the approaches in [8, 6, 37] , and thus a good candidate to define effective nonmonotonic extensions of DLs. The results on the rational closure in ALC (as an extension of Lehmann and Magidor's rational closure [33] ) extensively rely on the finite model property, which holds for ALC. However, the construction of rational closure can be extended to more expressive description logics that do not enjoy the finite model property. Some preliminary results on the rational closure for SHIQ [29] can be found in [26] .
Propositional rational closure: a semantic characterization

KLM rational system R
The language of logic R consists just of conditional assertions A | ∼ B. We here consider a richer language which also allows boolean combinations of assertions. Our language L is defined from a set of propositional variables ATM, the boolean connectives and the conditional operator | ∼. From propositional variables, propositional formulas are defined as usual in the propositional logic. We use A, B, C , . . . to denote propositional formulas (that do not contain conditional formulas), whereas F , G, . . . are used to denote all formulas (including conditionals). The formulas of L are defined as follows: if A is a propositional formula, A ∈ L; if A and B are propositional formulas, A | ∼ B ∈ L; if F is a boolean combination of formulas of L, then F ∈ L. A knowledge base K is a set of conditional assertions A | ∼ B. In this work, we restrict our attention to finite knowledge bases.
Before presenting the axiomatization of R, let us clarify one point: in its original presentation [33] , a conditional A | ∼ B is considered as a consequence relation between a pair of propositional formulas A and B, so that their systems provide a set of "postulates" (or closure conditions) that the intended consequence relation must satisfy. Alternatively, these postulates may be seen as rules to derive new conditionals from given ones. We take a slightly different viewpoint, shared, among others, by Halpern and Friedman [15] (see Section 8) and Boutilier [4] , who proposed a modal interpretation of R: in our understanding, this system is an ordinary logical system in which a conditional A | ∼ B is a formula belonging to the object language. Whenever we restrict our consideration, as done by Lehmann and Magidor in [33] , to the entailment of a conditional from a set of conditionals, the two viewpoints coincide, and a conditional is a logical consequence of a set of conditionals in logic R if and only if it belongs to all rational consequence relations extending that set of conditionals, or (in semantic terms), it is valid in all rational models (as defined by [33] ) of that set.
Here is the axiomatization of logic R. In our presentation Lehmann and Magidor's postulates/rules are just axioms. We use ⊢ PC (resp. | PC ) to denote provability (resp. validity) in the propositional calculus.
All axioms and rules of propositional logic (PC)
The axiom (CM) is called cumulative monotony and it is characteristic of all KLM logics, axiom (RM) is called rational monotony and it characterizes the logic of rational entailment R (it is what distinguishes rational from the weaker preferential entailment). In [15] , Friedman and Halpern have shown that the axiom system of R is complete with respect to a wide spectrum of different semantics (e.g. possibilistic structures and k-rankings), proposed in order to formalize some forms of nonmonotonic reasoning. This can be explained by the fact that all these models are examples of plausibility structures, and the truth in them is captured by the axioms of R.
The logic R enjoys a very simple modal semantics, actually it turns out that it corresponds to the flat fragment of the well-known conditional logic VC [34] . The modal semantics is defined by considering a set of worlds W equipped by an accessibility (or preference) relation <. Intuitively the meaning of x < y is that x is more typical/more normal/less exceptional than y. We say that a conditional • W is a non-empty set of worlds;
• < is an irreflexive, transitive relation on W satisfying modularity: for all x, y, z, if x < y then either x < z or z < y. < further satisfies the Smoothness condition defined below; • V is a function V : W −→ 2 ATM , which assigns to every world w the set of atoms holding in that world. If F is a boolean combination of formulas, its truth conditions (M, w | F ) are defined as for propositional logic. Let A be a propositional formula; we define Min
At this point we can define the Smoothness condition:
Validity and satisfiability of a formula are defined as usual. We say that a formula F is satisfiable if there is a rational model M = W, <, V and a world w ∈ W such that M, w | F . We say that a formula F is valid in a rational model M = W, <, V , and we write M | F , if, for all w ∈ W, it holds that M, w | F . We say that a formula F is valid if it is valid in all rational models, i.e. if, for all rational models M = W, <, V , it holds that M | F .
Given a set of formulas K of L and a model M = W, <, V , we say that M is a model of K , written M | K , if for every F ∈ K and every w ∈ W, we have that M, w | F . K rationally entails a formula F , written K | F if F is valid in all rational models of K . From now on, we will restrict our consideration to rational models with a finite set of worlds. Given a rational model M = W, <, V , let us now define the rank k M (w) of a world w and the rank k M (F ) of a formula F .
It is easy to see from Definition 1 that the truth condition of
A | ∼ B is "global" in a model M = W, <, V : given a world w, we have that M, w | A | ∼ B if, for all w ′ , if w ′ ∈ Min M < (A) then M, w ′ | B.
Definition 2 (Rank k
, is the length of the longest chain w 0 < . . . < w from w to a minimal w 0 (i.e. there is no w ′ such that w ′ < w 0 ). This definition makes sense even if the relation < is not modular. Observe that, for a modular relation on a finite set, all maximal chains 2 from an element w to a minimal w 0 have the same length.
The previous definition defines from < a rank function k M : W −→ N. The opposite is also possible and in general in rational models the rank function k M and < can be defined from each other by letting x < y if and only if k M (x) < k M (y) (this is similarly stated by [33] where a rank function k over a possibly infinite set is used, since there is no restriction to finite models) Hence, modular preferential models are called ranked models. 
Lehmann and Magidor's definition of rational closure
Although the operator | ∼ is nonmonotonic, the notion of rational entailment (defined in Definition 1) in itself is monotonic:
In order to strengthen R, Lehmann and Magidor in [33] propose the well-known mechanism of rational closure. As already mentioned, the main motivation of Lehmann and Magidor leading to the definition of rational closure was technical: it turns out that the intersection of all rational consequence relations satisfying a set of conditionals coincides with the weaker preferential consequence relation satisfying that set (that is weaker in that it does not satisfy (RM)), so that (i) the axiom/rule (RM) does not add anything and (ii) such relation in itself fails to satisfy (RM). Lehmann and Magidor's notion of rational closure provides a solution to both problems and can be seen as the "minimal" (in some sense) rational consequence completing a set of conditionals.
Since in rational closure no boolean combination of conditionals is allowed, in the following, the knowledge base K is just a finite set of positive conditional assertions of the form A | ∼ B. In such a case, rational entailment is equivalent to preferential entailment.
Definition 4 (Exceptionality of propositional formulas and conditional formulas).
Let K be a knowledge base (i.e. a finite set of positive conditional assertions) and A a propositional formula. A is said to be exceptional for K if and only if K | ⊤ | ∼ ¬A.
A conditional formula A | ∼ B is exceptional for K if its antecedent A is exceptional for K . The set of conditional formulas of K which are exceptional for K will be denoted as E(K ).
It is possible to define a non-increasing sequence of subsets of
. Observe that, being K finite, there is an n ≥ 0 such that C n = ∅ or for all m > n, C m = C n . The sets C i are used to define the rank of a formula, as in the next definition. Notice that if there is an m such that
Definition 5 (Rank of a formula).
A propositional formula A has rank i (for K ), written rank( A) = i, if and only if i is the least natural number for which A is not exceptional for C i . If A is exceptional for all C i then A has no rank.
As mentioned above, we can restrict our consideration to sequences C 0 , . . . , C n where C n is the first set in the sequence such that either C n = ∅ or C n = C n+1 : in both cases for all t > n, C t = C n , therefore the formulas exceptional for C t and C n coincide. For this reason, if a formula A has a rank, then rank( A) ≤ n.
The notion of rank of a formula allows to define the rational closure of a knowledge base K .
Definition 6 (Rational closure K of K ).
Let K be a conditional knowledge base. The rational closure K of K is the set of all A | ∼ B such that either (1) the rank of A is strictly less than the rank of A ∧ ¬B (this includes the case A has a rank and A ∧ ¬B has none), or (2) A has no rank.
This mechanism, which is now well-established, allows to overcome some weaknesses of R. First of all, it is closed under rational monotonicity (RM):
Furthermore, rational closure supports some of the wanted inferences that R does not support. For instance rational closure allows to deal with irrelevance: from monday | ∼ go_work, it does support the nonmonotonic conclusion that monday ∧ shines | ∼ go_work. In order to see that monday ∧ shines | ∼ go_work belongs to the rational closure of K = {monday | ∼ go_work}, observe that K | ⊤ | ∼ ¬(monday ∧ shines), therefore rank(monday ∧ shines) = 0. On the other hand, K | ⊤ | ∼ ¬(monday ∧ shines ∧ ¬ go_work), therefore rank(monday ∧ shines ∧ ¬go_work) > 0, from which we derive our nonmonotonic conclusion.
A semantic characterization of rational closure
Can we capture rational closure semantically? We aim to provide a semantic reconstruction of rational closure in terms of a minimal models' mechanism, thus providing an instantiation of the following general recipe for nonmonotonic reasoning:
(i) fix an underlying modal semantics for conditionals (here we concentrate on R but another possible choice could have been the weaker P, as done for instance in [19, 23, 17] ), (ii) obtain nonmonotonic inference by restricting semantic consequence to a class of "minimal" models. These minimal models should be chosen on the basis of semantic considerations, independent from the language and from the set of conditionals (knowledge base) whose nonmonotonic consequences we want to determine.
In some respects, this approach is similar in spirit to "minimal models" approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning, such as circumscription [35] . However, as a difference with circumscription, the models (i) have a modal semantics, and (ii) the preference relation among models is independent from the language. general recipe from other previous proposals such as [19] , in which the idea is that preferred models are those ones that minimize the truth of specific formulas of the form ¬ ¬A.
The minimal model mechanism is based on comparing different models in order to see which one is preferred. As for circumscription, there are mainly two ways of comparing models with the same domain:
• by keeping the valuation function fixed (only comparing M and M ′ if V and V ′ in the two models coincide); or
• by comparing M and M ′ also in case V = V ′ .
We consider the two possible semantics resulting from these alternatives.
As already mentioned, in this paper we limit our attention to knowledge bases K that are finite and that contain only positive conditionals. We begin by proving a property that links the rank k M of a formula in any rational model M of a given knowledge base K and the rank of that formula as calculated in the definition of rational closure (Definition 5). The proof is similar to that of Lemma 5.18 in [33] .
In the next proposition we shall use the notion of M i defined as follows. Let M = W, <, V be any rational model of K . Let M 0 = M and, for all i, let M i = W i , < i , V i be the rational model obtained from M by removing all the worlds w with
The C i sets are those ones used to define the rank of a formula in Definition 5. 
A consequence of the previous proposition is the following. 
Before we conclude the section we introduce one last proposition that we will use in the following. Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that K | A | ∼⊥, but for some i, C i | A | ∼⊥. In particular, let us consider the least i such that C i | A | ∼⊥. By definition of C i we can assume that C 0 ⊃ . . .
. . , ⊤ | ∼ ¬A n does not hold, respectively, i.e., in which there are worlds x 1 , . . . , x n (respectively) such that k
in C i this follows since for sure the minimal A i -worlds will be worlds already in the starting M (since C i−1 | ⊤ | ∼ ¬A i hence none of the x 1 , . . . , x n is an A i -world), and keep satisfying A i | ∼ B i as they did it in M. For A i | ∼ B i ∈ C i−1 − C i , by construction of M ′ , the minimal A i -worlds will be one of the x 1 , . . . , x n just introduced, and they satisfy the conditional 
Definition 7 (FIMS).
Given models M = W, <, V and M ′ = W ′ , < ′ , V ′ , we say that M is preferred to M ′ with respect to the fixed interpretations minimal semantics, and we write M < FIMS M ′ , if 
In our second semantics, we let the interpretations vary. The semantics is called variable interpretations minimal semantics, for short VIMS.
Definition 8 (VIMS).
Given models M = W, <, V and M ′ = W ′ , < ′ , V ′ we say that M is preferred to M ′ with respect to the variable interpretations minimal semantics, and write M < VIMS M ′ , if
Given a knowledge base K , we say that M is a minimal model of K with respect to < VIMS if M is a model of K and there is no M ′ such that M ′ is a model of K and M ′ < VIMS M. K minimally entails a formula F with respect to VIMS, and we write K | VIMS F , if F is valid in all models of K that are minimal with respect to < VIMS (among all the possible models of K ).
It is easy to realize that the two semantics, FIMS and VIMS, define different sets of minimal models. This is illustrated by the following example.
there can be a model M in which W = {x, y, z}, V (x) = {penguin, bird, fly, black}, V (y) = {penguin, bird}, V (z) = {bird, fly}, and z < y < x. M is a model of K , and it is minimal with respect to FIMS (indeed once fixed V (x), V (y), V (z) as above, it is not possible to lower the rank of x nor of y nor of z unless we falsify K ). Furthermore, in M x is a typical world in which "it is a penguin" and "it is black" hold (since there is no other world satisfying the same propositions which is preferred to it) where "it flies" holds. Therefore, K | FIMS penguin ∧ black | ∼ ¬fly.
On the other hand, M is not minimal with respect to VIMS. Indeed, consider the model
The example above shows that FIMS and VIMS lead to different sets of minimal models for a given K . Notice, however, that the model M ′ we have used to illustrate this fact is not a minimal model for K in VIMS. A minimal model in VIMS for K that can be defined on the set of worlds W is given by V (x) = V (y) = V (z) = {bird, fly}, and the empty relation <. This is quite a degenerate model of K in which "it is a penguin" is never true. This illustrates the strength of VIMS: in case of knowledge bases that only contain positive conditionals, logical entailment in VIMS collapses into classical logic entailment. This feature corresponds to a similar feature of the nonmonotonic logic P min in [19] (see Section 2.4), can be proven in the same way, and leads to the following proposition. As for P min this strong feature of VIMS can be prevented by adding existence assertions to the knowledge base, in the example we could add, for instance, ¬(penguin | ∼⊥) to force us to consider non-trivial models where the proposition "it is a penguin" is satisfied. In the next section, we will apply VIMS in a similar way, by restricting our consideration to knowledge bases that include existence assertions (expressed by negated conditionals).
A semantic reconstruction of rational closure
Can we capture rational closure within one or the other of the semantics above? A first conjecture might be that the FIMS of Definition 7 could capture rational closure. However, we are soon forced to recognize that this is not the case.
For instance, Example 1 above illustrates that {penguin | ∼ bird, penguin | ∼ ¬fly, bird | ∼ fly} | FIMS penguin ∧ black | ∼ ¬fly. On the contrary, it can be easily verified that penguin ∧ black | ∼ ¬fly is in the rational closure of {penguin | ∼ bird, penguin | ∼ ¬fly, bird | ∼ fly}. Therefore, FIMS as it is does not allow us to define a semantics corresponding to rational closure. Things change if we consider FIMS applied to models that contain all possible valuations compatible with a given knowledge base K . We call these models canonical models.
Example 2. Consider Example 1 above. If we restrict our attention to models that also contain a world w with V (w) = {penguin, bird, black} which satisfies "it is a penguin", "it is black" and "it does not fly" in which w is a typical world satisfying "it is a penguin", we are able to conclude that typically it holds that if it is a penguin and it is black then it does not fly, the same as in rational closure. Indeed, in all minimal FIMS models of K that also contain w with V (w) = {penguin, bird, black}, it holds that penguin ∧ black | ∼ ¬fly (in particular, in Example 1 above, adding w to M would give z < w and w < x).
We are led to the conjecture that FIMS restricted to canonical models could be the right semantics for rational closure.
Canonical models are defined with respect to the language L restricted to the propositional variables occurring in the knowledge base and in the query. Given a knowledge base K and a query Q , let ATM K ,Q be the set of all the propositional variables of ATM occurring in K or in the query Q , and let L K ,Q be the restriction of the language L to the propositional
where v is extended to arbitrary propositional formulas as usual). It can be easily shown that, for any knowledge base, a minimal canonical FIMS model exists: this is any canonical model in which every possible world w has the rank associated to the conjunction of all atoms and negated atoms in L K ,Q that it satisfies. This is stated by the following theorem.
Definition 9 (Canonical model).
A model M = W, <, V
Theorem 1. For any satisfiable K there exists a finite minimal canonical FIMS model M.
Proof. Since K is satisfiable consider a model M = W, <, V of K . Given the finite model property of R, we can assume, without loss of generality that M has a finite set of worlds. Let v 1 , . . . , v r be any enumeration of the truth assignments v i : ATM K,Q −→ {true, false} compatible with K . Observe that, since ATM K,Q is a finite set of propositional variables, the truth assignments v i as defined above are finitely many.
We proceed starting from M and extending it by the addition of new worlds. Let M 0 = M. For each i, from 1 to r, we reason as follows. If there is no world in 
; it is defined as < ′ on the worlds in W ′ and, for all x ∈ W i−1 and y ∈ W ′ , x < i y; (3) V i is defined as V i−1 on the worlds in W i−1 and it is defined as V ′ on the worlds in W ′ .
Observe, that the resulting model M i is the juxtaposition of the two models M i−1 and M ′ , where the rank of each world in M i−1 is lower than the rank of each world in M ′ . It is finite, as both M i−1 and M ′ are finite.
It is easy to see that, if M i−1 satisfies K , then M i satisfies K as well. Consider any conditional C | ∼ B ∈ K , and any world w ∈ Min
Given that M 0 = M is a model of K , we conclude that all the M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M r are models of K . After all the valuations v 1 , . . . , v r have been considered, we obtain a model M r of K which is canonical and is finite as well, as we have only considered finite models in the construction of M r . From M r , by Proposition 5, we can obtain a minimal canonical FIMS model. 2
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F
Please cite this article in press as: L. Giordano In the following, we show that the canonical models that are minimal with respect to FIMS are an adequate semantic counterpart of rational closure.
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. If i = 0, suppose for a contradiction that there is a w such that M,
Then it can be easily seen that the canonical model obtained from M by simply changing k M (w) into 0 is still a model of C 0 = K and it is preferred to M, thus contradicting the minimality of M.
For i > 0, we reason in a similar way: let us consider w ∈ W such that for all
and it is a model of K , as it satisfies all the conditionals in K . Let A | ∼ B ∈ K . It is clear that, for all the worlds w ′ ∈ W with
we know from the hypothesis that w satisfies A → B, and hence, w satisfies B. 
Proof. (Only if part) Let us assume that rank( A) = i. By definition of rank, we know that
A direct consequence of Proposition 8 together with the observation that if a formula has a rank then its maximal value is n where n is the last element of C 0 ⊃ . . . ⊃ C n such that C n = ∅ or such that for all m > n, C m = C n is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Let n be the last element of C
We can now prove the following theorem: case, by Definition 6, 
In case, A has a rank and A ∧ ¬B has not, suppose In Theorem 2 we have shown a correspondence between rational closure and minimal models with fixed interpretations, on the proviso that we restrict our attention to minimal canonical models. We can obtain the same effect by extending K into K ′ by adding negated conditionals: Definition 10. Let K be a knowledge base. We define
(that is C is a conjunction of literals whose propositional variables occur in the knowledge base or in the query).
Indeed it can be easily verified that all models of K ′ are canonical, hence restricting FIMS to canonical models on the one hand and considering the extension of K as K ′ on the other hand amounts to the same effect. We can therefore restate Theorem 2 above as follows: Notice that the size of K ′ is exponential in that of K . Before we go any further, let us point out that this characterization of rational closure, in terms of minimal canonical FIMS models, is related to Lehmann and Magidor's semantical characterization in [33] : we use canonical models, as they do, and we show a correspondence between the rank of a formula (syntactically defined in terms of exceptionality) and the rank of the formula in minimal canonical FIMS models. However the definition of minimal canonical FIMS models that we use here, based on a specific preference relation between different canonical models, is different from the definition provided in [33] (see Section 5.3, Definition 20) where the involved preference relation is defined in terms of conditionals satisfied in the compared models.
We may wonder whether the restriction to canonical models can be lifted by adopting a semantics based on variable valuations. In general the answer is negative. We have already mentioned that, if we consider knowledge bases containing only positive conditionals, logical entailment in VIMS collapses into classical logic entailment. To avoid this collapse, we can require that, when we are checking for entailment of a conditional A | ∼ B from a K , at least an A ∧ B-world and an A ∧ ¬B-world be present in the models of K . This can be obtained by adding to K the conditionals ¬(A ∧ B | ∼ ⊥) and ¬(A ∧ ¬B | ∼ ⊥). Also in this case, however, we cannot give a positive answer to the above question. Indeed, it is possible to build a model of K , minimal with respect to VIMS, which falsifies a conditional A | ∼ B which, on the contrary, is satisfied in all the canonical minimal models of K under FIMS. This is shown by the following: Example 3. Let K be as follows: 
We define a model M = (W, <, V ) of K ′ , which is minimal with respect to VIMS, as follows: W = {x, w, y 1 .y 2 , y 3 }, where: M is a model of K which is minimal with respect to VIMS. Also, A | ∼ B is falsified in M, while, on the contrary, A | ∼ B holds in all the canonical models minimal with respect to FIMS. Indeed, in all such models the rank of k( A ∧ B) = 1 while k( A ∧ ¬B) = 2. However, it is not possible to construct a model M ′ with 5 worlds so that M ′ < VIMS M. In particular, lowering the rank of w is never possible, since w is a non-typical D-world, and typical D-worlds are non-typical ⊤-worlds, hence w will always have rank at least 2. For x we reason in a different way: although in principle it could have rank 1, assigning to x rank 1 entails that there are at least 4 distinct R, L, E and H -worlds with rank 0. But this is impossible given that we have only 5 worlds in the model. In order to satisfy all these formulas by a single world, we have to introduce a world at level 1 (which can be a non-S and therefore satisfy pairs of these formulas). This is world y 2 , whose rank cannot therefore be lowered. y 2 cannot be a D-world, we therefore need y 3 which is a minimal D-world that can have rank at least 1 and whose rank cannot therefore be lowered.
As suggested by this example, in order to characterize rational closure in terms of VIMS, we should restrict our consideration to models which contain "enough" worlds. In the following, as in Theorem 3, we enrich K with negated conditionals but, as a difference with K ′ of Theorem 3, we only need to add to K a polynomial number of negated conditionals (instead of an exponential number). The purpose of the addition is that of restricting our attention to models that are minimal with respect to < VIMS and that have a set of worlds "large" enough to have, in principle, a distinct most-preferred world for each antecedent of conditionals in K . Intuitively, this condition discards the models, as the one illustrated by the example above, in which a formula (e.g. A ∧ B) has a rank higher than the rank it could have just because there are not enough worlds (and lowering the rank of a formula would lead to the falsification of some conditionals in K ).
For this reason, we expand K into K ′′ by adding, for each antecedent C of a conditional formulas in K , a new corresponding atom φ C , and by requiring that all these new atoms are mutually disjoint. This will guarantee that all models of K ′′ will have a distinct world satisfying each newly introduced atom φ C and its corresponding formula C . Furthermore, if the problem to be addressed is that of knowing whether A | ∼ B is logically entailed by K , we also introduce φ A∧B and φ A∧¬B in order to also have a distinct world associated to A ∧ B and A ∧ ¬B. This is stated in a formal way in the following definition.
Definition 11. Given a knowledge base K , we define:
We can now establish a correspondence between FIMS and VIMS. By virtue of Theorem 2, this allows us to establish a correspondence between rational closure and VIMS, as stated by Theorem 1. Proof. We show the contrapositive of the two directions.
We show that this goes against the minimality of M ′ .
From M and M ′ we build a model M * = W * , < * , V * such that M * is a model of K ′′ and M * < VIMS M ′ . In particular, for each formula in A K ,A| ∼B , we include in W * a minimal world from M satisfying that formula. More precisely, we introduce in W * the following worlds from M:
For these worlds, we define V * = V and k M * = k M . If the same element y is associated to two different formulas it must be duplicated into y and y ′ (and V * (y ′ ) = V * (y) and k M * (y ′ ) = k M * (y)).
Furthermore, for each world y introduced as a representative of Min M < (C), V * (y) is extended in order to include φ C . < * is straightly defined from k M * in the obvious way. The construction is almost finished. Notice that up to this point we have introduced in W * no more elements than those in W ′ . To conclude we have to rename the elements of W * with the names as the elements of W ′ that satisfy the same φ C , and we have to add to W * the elements of W ′ that are eventually missing (we let for these cases
It can be shown that M * is a model of K ′′ , and M * < VIMS M ′ , against the minimality of M ′ . First of all, we show that M * is a model of K ′′ . Indeed, by construction we have introduced a new element y of M for each C antecedent of a conditional in K or equal to A ∧ B or A ∧ ¬B, and this element is still in Min 
For the conditionals with form φ C i ∧ φ C j | ∼⊥: they hold in M * since we have suitably extended V * in order to include at most one φ C at a time.
Last, it obviously holds that M * < VIMS M ′ . Indeed the set of worlds of the two models coincide, and for all y taken from M ′ , k M * (y) = k M ′ (y), and for all y taken from M, they were introduced as representatives of a given C antecedent of a conditional or equal to A ∧ B, A ∧ ¬B. For all these formulas by Proposition 2 and 8, it holds that
Consider the model M * built as in the first part of the construction used above. More precisely M * = W * , < * , V * is built from M by cutting out its portion containing:
If the same element y is associated to two different formulas, it must be duplicated into y and y ′ (and V * (y ′ ) = V * (y) and k M * (y ′ ) = k M * (y)). Furthermore, for each world y associated to a formula C , V * (y) is extended in order to include φ C . Last, < * is defined from k M * in the obvious way. By reasoning similarly to what we have done above, we can show that M * is a model of K ′′ . Furthermore, there cannot be an M * ′ < VIMS M * . Indeed, any model of We conclude the section with a comparison with the related works on rational closure. 
Relation with P min and Pearl's System Z
In [19] an alternative nonmonotonic extension of preferential logic P called P min is proposed. Similarly to the semantics presented in this work, P min is based on a minimal modal semantics. However the preference relation among models is defined in a different way. Intuitively, in P min the fact that a world x is a minimal A-world is expressed by the fact that x satisfies A ∧ 2¬A, where 2 is defined with respect to the inverse of the preference relation (i.e. with respect to the accessibility relation given by Ruv if and only if v < u). The idea is that preferred models are those that minimize the set of worlds where ¬ ¬A holds, that is A-worlds which are not minimal. As a difference from the approach presented in this work, the semantics of P min is defined starting from preferential models, in which the relation < is irreflexive and transitive (thus, no longer modular).
P min is a nonmonotonic logic considering only P models that, intuitively, minimize the non-typical worlds. More precisely, given a set of formulas
, and the set of pairs (w, ¬ ¬A) such that M, w | ¬ ¬A is strictly included in the corresponding set for N . A model M is a minimal model for K if it is a model of K and there is not a model M ′ of K which is preferred to M. Entailment in P min is restricted to minimal models of a given set of formulas K . In Section 3 of [19] it is observed that the logic P min turns out to be quite strong. In general, if we only consider knowledge bases containing only positive conditionals, we get the same trivialization result (part of Proposition 1 in [19] ) as the one contained in Proposition 6 for VIMS. This does not hold for rational closure. This is the reason why we have introduced the additional assumptions in order to obtain an equivalence with rational closure. Similarly, in order to tackle this trivialization in P min , Section 3 in [19] is focused on the so called well-behaved knowledge bases, that explicitly include that A is possible (¬( A | ∼ ⊥)) for all conditional assertions A | ∼ B in the knowledge base.
We may now wonder whether P min is equivalent to VIMS, which is seemingly the closer semantics. Or whether VIMS is equivalent to a stronger version of P min obtained by replacing P with R as the underlying logic. We call R min this stronger version of P min . 
Notice that, since ¬(italian ∧ PhD | ∼⊥) entails both that ¬(italian | ∼⊥) and that ¬(PhD | ∼⊥), and that this in turn entails ¬(adult | ∼⊥), K ′ is also well-behaved.
It can be easily verified that the logical consequences of K ′ in P min , R min and VIMS differ. In both P min and R min , for instance, we derive neither that italian ∧ PhD | ∼ house_owner nor that italian ∧ PhD | ∼ ¬house_owner: the two alternatives are equivalent. On the other hand, in VIMS we derive that italian ∧ PhD | ∼ ¬house_owner.
The previous example shows that in some cases VIMS is stronger than both P min and R min . The following one shows that the two approaches are incomparable, since there are also logical consequences that hold for both P min and R min but not for VIMS.
What do we derive about typical italian ∧ PhD ∧ work, for instance? Do they inherit the property of typical Italians of being house_owner?
Again, in order to prevent the entailment of italian ∧ PhD ∧ work | ∼⊥ from K both in VIMS and in P min and R min , we add to K the constraint that Italians with a PhD who work exist, henceforth they also have typical instances. Therefore we expand K into:
By reasoning as in Example 4 we can show that K ′ is a well-behaved knowledge base. Now it can be easily shown that the conditional assertion italian ∧ PhD ∧ work | ∼ house_owner is entailed in P min and R min , whereas nothing is entailed in VIMS. This difference can be explained intuitively as follows. The set of properties for which an individual is atypical matters in P min and R min , where one has to minimize the set of distinct ¬ ¬C : even if an italian ∧ PhD ∧ work is an atypical PhD, P min and R min still maximize its typicality as an Italian, and therefore entail that it is a house_owner, as all typical Italians. As a difference, in VIMS, what matters is the set of individuals which are more typical than a given x, rather than the set of properties by which they are more typical. As a consequence, since an x which is italian ∧ PhD ∧ work is an atypical PhD, there is no need to maximize its typicality as an Italian, as long as this does not increase the set of individuals more typical than x. 
. Then the two entailment relations are defined as follows: 
which is valid in any KLM logic, whence in rational closure (as well as in our semantics). However, two definitions should make apparent the relations with our semantics and rational closure. If we consider a K such that
we get an obvious correspondence between our canonical models (which will contain worlds for very possible propositional interpretation) and models of Pearl's semantics. The correspondence preserves FIMS minimality, so that we immediately get: [38, 39] . However, it only works for knowledge bases with the strong consistency assumption as above.
Rational closure in description logics
As recalled in the Introduction, nonmonotonic reasoning in Description Logic has attracted an increasing interest in the last years [40, 2, 1, 12, 30, 8, 23, 5, 32, 13, 37] . Our purpose is to investigate whether rational closure can be extended in order to support nonmonotonic reasoning to Description Logics.
In this section, we extend to ALC the notion of rational closure proposed by Lehmann and Magidor [33] , recalled in Section 2.2, and we define a semantic characterization of this notion of rational closure by introducing a minimal model semantics for ALC with typical inclusions. This semantics is a direct generalization of the minimal (canonical) model semantics introduced in Section 2.3.
To express typical inclusions, ALC is extended with a typicality operator T, following the approach in [17, 23] . Differently from [23] , here we consider special kinds of preferential models, namely, rational models, to define the semantics of the T operator, and we use a different notion of preference between models, namely, the preference relation < FIMS , introduced in Section 2.3. Given the typicality operator, the typical assertion T(C ) ⊑ D (all the typical C 's are D's) plays the role of the conditional assertion C | ∼ D in R. We show that the correspondence result established by Theorem 2 can be lifted from the propositional calculus to ALC.
The logic ALC + T R
In order to apply rational closure to DLs we proceed in two steps. First, similarly to [17] , we extend the standard ALC by a typicality operator T that allows to single out the typical instances of a concept. Since we are dealing here with rational closure (that builds over R), we attribute to T properties related to R. The resulting logic is called ALC + T R . As a second step, we build over ALC + T R a rational closure mechanism.
Our starting point is therefore the extension of logic ALC with a typicality operator T: we allow concepts of the form T(C ), whose intuitive meaning is that T(C ) selects the typical instances of a concept C . We can therefore distinguish between the properties that hold for all instances of concept C (C ⊑ D), and those that only hold for the typical such instances (T(C ) ⊑ D).
Definition 12.
We consider an alphabet of concept names C, of role names R, and of individual constants O. Given A ∈ C and R ∈ R, we define: 
A knowledge base is a pair (TBox, ABox). TBox contains a finite set of concept inclusions C L ⊑ C R . ABox contains assertions of the form C L (a) and R(a, b), where a, b ∈ O.
The semantics of ALC + T R can be formulated in terms of rational models: ordinary models of ALC are equipped with a preference relation < on the domain, whose intuitive meaning is to compare the "typicality" of domain elements, that is to say x < y means that x is more typical than y. Typical members of a concept C , that is members of T(C ), are the members x of C that are minimal with respect to this preference relation (s.t. there is no other member of C more typical than x).
Definition 13 (Semantics of ALC + T R ).
A model M of ALC + T R is any structure , <, I where:
• is the domain;
• < is an irreflexive, transitive and modular (if x < y then either x < z or z < y) relation over ;
• I is the extension function that maps each concept C to C I ⊆ , and each role R to R I ⊆ × . For concepts of ALC, C I is defined in the usual way. For the T operator, we have
where Min < (S) = {u : u ∈ S and ∄z ∈ S s.t. z < u}.
Furthermore, < satisfies the Well-Foundedness Condition, i.e., for all S ⊆ , for all x ∈ S, either x ∈ Min < (S) or ∃y ∈ Min < (S) such that y < x. 3 The semantics with one single preference relation < is the one that, as we will show, corresponds to rational closure.
One may think of considering a sharper semantics with several preference relations, we briefly discuss this variant in the last section. An alternative equivalent semantics of the T operator by means of a set of postulates that are essentially a reformulation of axioms and rules of nonmonotonic entailment in rational logic R can be found in Appendix A, together with the proof of the equivalence.
Definition 14 (Model satisfying a knowledge base).
Given an ALC + T R model M = , <, I , we assume that I is extended to assign a domain element a I of to each individual constant a of O. We say that:
Given a knowledge base K = (TBox, ABox), we say that:
• M satisfies TBox if M satisfies all inclusions in TBox (written M | ALC+T R TBox);
• M satisfies ABox if M satisfies all assertions in ABox (written M | ALC+T R ABox);
• M satisfies K if it satisfies both its TBox and its ABox (written M | ALC+T R K );
• a concept C is satisfiable with respect to K , if there is a model M = , <, I satisfying K and such that C I = ∅.
It is worth noticing that, as a difference with our previous approach in [23] , here we do not assume the unique name assumption, that is to say we do not assume that, in a model M, I is extended to assign a distinct element a I of to each individual constant a of O. In [23] , UNA is needed since the properties of the preference relation < are built from preferential logic P: in that case, the unique name assumption avoids that models in which two names are mapped into the same individual of the domain are preferred to those in which they are mapped into distinct ones. This is needed in order to perform useful reasoning about two different individuals named in the ABox. As we will see in Definition 23 below, we restrict our concern to the only case of an FIMS semantics based on the minimization of ranks, therefore the unique name assumption is no longer needed.
By a construction similar to that used in Theorem 2.3 of [17] for the weaker logic ALC + T, we can prove the following theorem. The proofs and further details are provided in the technical report [25] . 3 Observe that, although in [17, 23] we have called the above condition Smoothness condition, this condition is stronger than the smoothness condition introduced in the propositional case (Definition 1). Indeed, the condition above considers all subsets S of and does not only apply to the interpretations C I of the concepts C of the language. It is easy to prove that such a condition is equivalent to require that ( , <) is well-founded, i.e. there is no infinite descending chain of individuals. In the following, we keep the same condition as in previous work, but we call it well-foundedness condition. Let us define the derivability of an inclusion and of an assertion in ALC + T R :
Definition 15. Given a knowledge base K , an inclusion C L ⊑ C R and an assertion C L (a), with a ∈ O, we say that:
holds in all models M = , <, I satisfying K .
As usual, when, for a given knowledge base K and a concept C , it holds that K | ALC+T R C ⊑ ⊥ we say that C is satisfiable with respect to K .
As an easy consequence of Theorem 6, we prove the following corollary: As for propositional rational models, finite ALC + T R models (to which we can restrict attention by Theorem 6) can be equivalently defined by postulating the existence of a function k M : −→ N, where k M assigns a finite rank to each world, and is defined as follows.
Corollary 2. Given a knowledge base K and a concept C satisfiable with respect to K , then there exists a finite
ALC + T R model M = , <, I satisfying K , such that C I = ∅.
Definition 16 (Rank of a domain element k M (x)
). Given a model M = , <, I , the rank k M of a domain element x ∈ , is the length of the longest chain x 0 < . . . < x from x to a minimal x 0 (i.e. such that there is no x ′ such that x ′ < x 0 ).
As for the propositional case, the rank function k M and < can be defined from each other by letting x < y if and only if k M (x) < k M (y).
Definition 17 (Rank of a concept k
If C R I = ∅, then C R has no rank and we write k M (C R ) = ∞.
It is immediate to verify that:
Proposition 11. For any M = , <, I , we have that M satisfies T(C ) ⊑ D if and only if k
As already mentioned, although the typicality operator T itself is nonmonotonic (i.e. T(C ) ⊑ D does not imply T(C ⊓ E) ⊑ D), the logic ALC + T R is monotonic: what is inferred from K can still be inferred from any K ′ with K ⊆ K ′ . This is a clear limitation in DLs. As a consequence of the monotonicity of ALC + T R , one cannot deal with irrelevance, for instance. So one cannot derive from K = {Penguin ⊑ Bird, T(Bird) ⊑ Fly, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly} that K | ALC+T R T(Penguin ⊓ Black) ⊑ ¬Fly, even if the property of being black is irrelevant with respect to flying. In the same way, if we add to K the information that Jim is a bird (Bird(jim)), in ALC + T R one cannot tentatively derive, in the absence of information to the contrary, that it is a typical bird and therefore it flies (T(Bird)(jim) and Fly(jim)). In the following section we investigate the possibility of overcoming this weakness by extending to ALC + T R the notion of rational closure. As we will see, this extension allows to deal with irrelevance and allows to attribute typical properties to individuals.
Rational closure of the TBox in ALC + T R
In this section, we extend to ALC + T R the definition of rational closure introduced by Lehmann and Magidor for the propositional case. We first consider the rational closure with respect to TBox, in which essentially we only consider which concept inclusions belong to the rational closure of K. Next we will consider rational closure with respect to ABox, in which we consider the individuals explicitly named in the Abox, and derive their properties.
Let us first define the notion of query: a query is either an inclusion relation or an assertion of the ABox; we want to check whether it is entailed from a given knowledge base.
Definition 18 (Query). A query F is either an assertion
C L (a) or an inclusion relation C L ⊑ C R . Given a model M = , <, I , a query F holds in M if M satisfies F , i.e. if a I ∈ (C L (a)) I or C I L ⊆ C I R , respectively. 4
Definition 19 (Exceptionality of concepts and inclusions).
Let K = (TBox, ABox) be a knowledge base. A concept C is said to be exceptional for K if and only if
The set of T-inclusions of K which are exceptional in K will be denoted as E(K ).
Note that, differently from Lehmann and Magidor's notion of exceptionality in Section 2.2, the exceptionality of a concept is defined also taking into account the ABox. This is needed when the ABox contains typicality assertions of the form T(C )(a).
Indeed, as we will see later with an example, the construction of the rational closure of the TBox of a knowledge base K is affected by the presence of typicality assertions in the ABox: if the assertions T(C )(a) and ¬D(a) are in the ABox, it is not the case that all the typical C 's are D's, so that the defeasible inclusion T(C ) ⊑ D does not hold.
Similarly to the propositional case, in the following we introduce a sequence of knowledge bases, starting from the initial one, K , in order to iteratively use exceptionality in the construction of the rational closure. At each step, in order to reason about the following exceptional subset of K , we remove the inclusions T(C ) ⊑ D of K that are not exceptional for K . Before we do this, if there is an assertion T(C )(a) in ABox, we add to a all the typical properties of C that we are removing. Because we want to reason in the same way for equivalent concepts, this leads us to the slightly more complicated formulation of ABox i below. Informally, for the definition of ABox i , if T(B)(a) ∈ ABox (i.e., a is a typical B-element), and B has rank i − 1, then, for all the inclusions T(C ) ⊑ D in (E i−1 − E i ), since C has also rank i − 1 we have that: if a is a C -element, then it is a typical C -element and the assertion (¬C ⊔ D)(a) must hold.
Note that, when the ABox does not contain typicality assertions of the form T(C )(a), we have that, for all i, ABox i = ABox. In this case, ABox i is irrelevant to determine the exceptionality of concepts as E i | ALC+T R T(⊤) ⊑ ¬C if and only if TBox i | ALC+T R T(⊤) ⊑ ¬C , for all concepts C . As in this case the definition of exceptionality of concepts does not depend 4 The notion of query we have just defined does not consider the case of querying about role instances, that is to say of the form R(a, b) , where R is a role name and a, b are individual names occurring in the ABox. The reason is that in ALC + T R , like in the basic ALC, for any knowledge base K = TBox ∪ ABox, and any role instance R(a, b) as above, it holds that if K is satisfiable, then K | ALC+TR R(a, b) if and only if R(a, b) ∈ ABox (if K is not satisfiable everything follows), thus neither the logic ALC + T R , nor the rational closure construction add any inferential power. This of course would not necessarily be true in extensions of ALC containing for instance role constructors. on the ABox, the construction above can be simplified, by taking E 0 = TBox and E i = TBox i , and evaluating exceptionality only with respect to the TBox. Hence, we can avoid the computation of the ABox i s and the construction becomes quite similar to the one of Lehmann and Magidor recalled in Section 2.2. This simplified construction can be found in [24] .
Definition 21 (Rank of a concept).
A concept C has rank i (denoted by rank(C ) = i) for K = (TBox, ABox), if and only if i is the least natural number for which C is not exceptional for E i . If C is exceptional for all E i then rank(C ) = ∞, and we say that C has no rank.
Consider the least n ≥ 0 such that, for all m > n, TBox m = TBox n or TBox m = ∅. Then from the above definition it follows that if a concept C has a rank, its highest possible value is n. As for propositional logic, the notion of rank of a formula allows to define the rational closure of a knowledge base K with respect to TBox.
Definition 22 (Rational closure of TBox).
Let K = (TBox, ABox) be a DL knowledge base. We define TBox, the rational closure of TBox, as We can show that the presence of typicality assertions in the ABox has an impact on the construction of the rational closure. Observe that the last two assertions in ABox 1 have been introduced as T(Bird)(opus) ∈ ABox, and Bird is not exceptional in E 0 . Observe also that E 1 | ALC+T R T(⊤) ⊑ ¬(Penguin ⊓ Violet) and the assertion (¬Bird ⊔ ∀HasFriend.Fly)(opus) in ABox 1 is needed to infer that pio flies and hence, although it is a typical violet penguin, pio cannot be a typical penguin.
We get rank(Penguin ⊓ Violet) = 2, while rank(Penguin) = 1, and rank(Bird) = 0. Hence, we can conclude that typical penguins are not violet, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Violet ∈ TBox, as rank(Penguin) < rank(Penguin ⊓ Violet).
So far we have extended to ALC +T R the syntactic notion of rational closure. We wonder whether we provide a semantic characterization of this notion by extending the semantic characterization given at the propositional level.
As for the propositional case (in the case of FIMS), in order to semantically characterize the rational closure, we first restrict our attention to minimal rational models that minimize the rank of domain elements. Informally, given two models of K , one in which a given domain element x has rank 2 (because for instance z < y < x), and another in which it has rank 1 (because only y < x), we prefer the latter, as in this model the element x is assumed to be "more typical" than in the former.
Definition 23 (Minimal models).
Given a knowledge base K , we say that M is a minimal model of K with respect to < FIMS if it is a model satisfying K and there is no M ′ model satisfying K such that M ′ < FIMS M.
It is worth noticing that roles are not considered in Definition 23, in other words, they are allowed to vary in the proposed preferential semantics. Subsequently, as for the propositional case, we restrict our attention to minimal canonical models. We define S as the set of all the concepts (and subconcepts) occurring in K or in the query F together with their complements (observe that S is finite).
In order to define canonical models, we consider all the sets of concepts {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n } ⊆ S that are consistent with K , i.e., s.t.
Definition 24 (Canonical model with respect to S). Given K = (TBox, ABox) and a query F , a model M = , <, I satisfying K is canonical with respect to S if, for each set of concepts {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n } ⊆ S consistent with K , there exists (at least) a domain element x ∈ such that x ∈ (
The intuition is that a canonical model contains all the individuals that enjoy properties that are consistent with the knowledge base. This is needed when reasoning about the (relative) rank of the concepts: it is important to have them all represented. As we will see in Theorem 7, in ALC the existence of a canonical model is guaranteed for any consistent knowledge base. However, this may be not true for more expressive logics and, in particular, this is not true for SHOIQ [28] (see Example 4 in [27] ).
Next we define the notion of minimal canonical model.
Definition 25 (Minimal canonical models (with respect to TBox)). M is a minimal canonical model of K if it satisfies K , it is minimal (with respect to Definition 23) and it is canonical (according to Definition 24).
We can now prove the following:
Theorem 7. For any consistent knowledge base K , there exists a finite, minimal canonical model of K with respect to TBox.
Proof. Let M = , <, I be a finite model of K (which exists by the finite model property, since K is consistent), and let {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n } ⊆ S be any subset of S consistent with K . We show that we can expand M in order to obtain a finite model of K that contains an instance of C 1 ⊓ C 2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ C n . By repeating the same construction for all maximal consistent subsets {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n } of S, we eventually obtain a finite canonical model of K . Indeed, for each and as I ′ on elements in ′ , that is to say, for all atomic concepts C ∈ C and all roles R ∈ R:
for the elements in x ∈ , and k M ′ * (x) = n + k M ′ (x) for all the elements x ∈ ′ , where n is the maximum value of k M in M (n is finite, as each element of M has a finite rank). < ′ * is straightforwardly defined from k M ′ * by letting x < ′ * y if and only if k M ′ * (x) < k M ′ * (y). It can be verified that M ′ * is a finite model of K which contains an instance of C 1 ⊓ C 2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ C n . For the inclusions and assertions of K that do not contain T this is obviously true. For the inclusions containing T, for each
In both cases x is an instance of D (since both M and M ′ satisfy K ), therefore x ∈ D I ′ * , and M ′ * satisfies K . By repeating the same construction for all the (finitely many) maximal consistent subsets {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n } of S, we obtain a finite canonical model of K , call it M + . We do not know whether M + is minimal. Observe that, as the domain + of M + is finite, the rank of each element in + is finite. If M + is not minimal, then there is a model M 1 (over the same domain + ) preferred to M + , such that, for all x ∈ + k M 1 (x) ≤ k M + (x) and for some y ∈ + k M 1 (y) < k M + (y). Again, if M 1 is not minimal there must be another M 2 preferred to M 1 . And so on, lowering the ranks. As the domain + is finite, this descending chain of models cannot be infinite and, eventually, we reach a minimal canonical model of K . 2
To prove the correspondence between minimal canonical models and the rational closure of a TBox, we need to introduce some propositions. Given an ALC + T R model M = , <, I , we define a sequence M 0 , M 1 , M 2 , . . . of models as follows: We let M 0 = M and, for all i, we let M i = , < i , I be the ALC + T R model obtained from M by assigning a rank 0 to all the domain elements x with 
To prove that M i | ALC+T R E i , we also need to show that M i | ALC+T R ABox i . By construction, for all the assertions C (a) ∈ ABox, M | ALC+T R C (a) and there is an element x ∈ such that x ∈ C Proof. We prove (1) . If i = 0, we have that K | ALC+T R T(⊤) ⊑ ¬C . Then there is a model M 0 of K with a domain element x such that k M 0 (x) = 0 and x is an instance of C . Consider the maximal consistent set of concepts in S of which x is an instance in M 0 . This is a maximal consistent set
For all i > 0 we proceed as follows. We have that E i | ALC+T R T(⊤) ⊑ ¬C , then there must be a model M i = i , < i , I i of E i , and a domain element x such that k M i (x) = 0 and x is an instance of C . Consider the maximal consistent set of concepts {C 1 , . . . , C r } ⊆ S of which x is an instance in M i . Clearly, C ∈ {C 1 , . . . , C r }. Furthermore, rank( ¬C and C ∈ {C 1 , . . . , C r }), whereas clearly by the existence of x,
We have to prove that the set {C 1 , . . . , C r } is consistent with K . The proof is the same for i = 0 and for i > 0. Let M i = i , < i , I i be the model, considered few lines above in this proof, such that x ∈ i is an instance of C . Starting from a finite model M = , <, I of K (M exists by the finite model property, Theorem 6), we add to M all the domain elements of M i .
We 
For all individual constants a ∈ O, we let a I ′ = a I . Finally, for all w ∈ , we let k M ′ (w) = k M (w) and, for all y ∈ i , we let
where n is the highest value of k M in M (n is finite as each element in M has a finite rank).
We can show that by construction the resulting model satisfies K . Let C ⊑ D be an inclusion in TBox. We distinguish two cases: C does not contain the typicality operator and C = T (B) for some B. In the first case, C ⊆ D is a strict inclusion. Let x ∈ C I ′ . There are two cases: either x ∈ or x ∈ i . In the first case,
In the second case, x ∈ C I i . As M i satisfies all the strict inclusions in K (which belong to E i ),
Observe that all the assertions in the ABox are satisfied in M and we have interpreted individual constants over the elements of
From this, we can conclude that M ′ is a model satisfying K and (C 1 ⊓ C 2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ C r ) I ′ = ∅. From this, point (1) follows. Let us prove point (2) . By point (1), if rank(C ) = i there is a {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C r } ⊆ S maximal and consistent with K containing C and such that rank(C 1 ⊓ C 2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ C r ) = i. By Definition 24, we know that in all canonical models there is at least an instance of (C 1 ⊓ C 2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ C r ). To prove point (2) we show that in all minimal canonical models
We show that this contradicts the minimality of M. From M we build another model M ′ = ′ , < ′ , I ′ of K by lowering the ranks of some elements in M and leaving all the rest unchanged. We let ′ = and I ′ = I . For each element y ∈ , let {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C r } ⊆ S be the maximal set of concepts consistent with K of which y is an instance. If rank(
Observe that we can obtain M ′ from the model M by repeatedly lowering the rank of the elements in rank by rank, starting from rank i = 0. M ′ would still be a model of TBox: at each step, when the rank of an element y is lowered to i (together with all the other elements whose rank is lowered to i), the only thing that changes with respect to M is that y might have become in M ′ a minimal instance of a concept of which it was only a non-typical instance in M. This might compromise the satisfaction in M ′ of a typicality inclusion as T(E) ⊑ G. We show that this cannot happen by reasoning by induction on i to prove that, after lowering the rank of an element y in , the modified model still satisfies all the inclusions in K . Let
It can be easily proven that being rank(
We consider two cases: rank(E) ≥ i and rank(E) < i. If rank(E) ≥ i we reason as above (with E i instead of K and i instead of 0) to conclude that if E ∈ {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C r } also G ∈ {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C r }, hence if y ∈ E I ′ , also y ∈ G I ′ , and T(E) ⊑ G holds in M ′ . If rank(E) < i, then rank(E) ≤ i − 1, and we know by construction that k M ′ (E) < i and y is not a minimal instance of E in M ′ . Hence lowering the rank of y does not compromise the satisfaction of T(E) ⊑ G ∈ E i .
The resulting M ′ is such that for all maximal set of concepts consistent with
. Furthermore, by the above reasoning, M ′ satisfies TBox. We show that M ′ also satisfies ABox, and in particular it is not the case that a T(B)(a) ∈ ABox might turn false in M ′ .
For all assertions T(B)(a) ∈ ABox, from the hypothesis we know that M satisfies T(B)(a). Hence, there is a z ∈ such that a I = z and z ∈ (T (B)) I . We show that it must be the case that z ∈ (T (B)) I ′ and, therefore, T(B)(a) is satisfied in 
As by the construction of M ′ , it must be that k M ′ (a
it is not possible that there is an element y ∈ B I ′ such that
In fact, otherwise it would be: k M ′ (y) < rank(B), which contradicts Proposition 12, point (1) . This concludes the proof that M ′ satisfies ABox.
It follows that M ′ would be a model of K , and M ′ < FIMS M, against the minimality of M. We are therefore forced to conclude that 
If T(C ) ⊑ D ∈ TBox, then by Definition 22, either (a) rank(C ) < rank(C ⊓ ¬D), or (b) C has no rank. Let M be any minimal canonical model of K . In the case (a), by Proposition 13, Computing each ABox i requires to check whether E i−1 | ALC+T R T(⊤) ⊑ ¬B which requires an exponential time in the size of E i−1 (and hence in the size of K ).
If not already checked, the exceptionality of C and of C ⊓ ¬D have to be checked for each TBox i , to determine the ranks of C and of C ⊓ ¬D (which also requires an exponential time in the size of K ). Hence, verifying if T(C ) ⊑ D ∈ TBox is in ExpTime. 2
The above result provides an ExpTime upper bound for deciding whether T(C ) ⊑ D ∈ TBox (the ExpTime lower bound comes from the fact that subsumption in ALC is ExpTime-hard). It requires a quadratic (in the size of K ) number of calls to an ExpTime algorithm for checking subsumption in ALC + T R . In the case the ABox does not contain typicality assertions, it is possible to see that subsumption in ALC + T R can be polynomially reduced to subsumption in ALC so that optimized ALC prover can be used to this purpose. The encoding is the same as the one introduced in [26] for reducing subsumption in SHIQ R T to subsumption in SHIQ (see [26] , Proposition 3).
To conclude the session, we want to observe that our definition of exceptionality (Definition 19), which exploits preferential entailment, cannot be equivalently replaced with a notion of exceptionality which directly exploits entailment in ALC over the materialization of the KB, in the spirit of the other proposals of rational closure in [8, 7] . In particular, consider a knowledge base K = (TBox, ABox) and let K S = {A ⊑ B | A ⊑ B ∈ TBox} be the set of strict inclusions in K and If we adopt the definition of exceptionality introduced just above, we get a different result. We have:
For the second statement, observe that there is an ALC model satisfying K S containing a Faun-element x, which is an instance ofK D and is not a Winged Horse, but is in the relation HasFriend with a WingedHorse-element y. Also, y is not required to be an instance ofK D . Hence, Faun is not exceptional with respect to K while WingedHorse is exceptional, and we get rank(Faun) = 0 and rank(WingedHorse) = ∞. Therefore, with this notion of exceptionality, T(Faun) ⊑ ⊥ would not be in the rational closure of TBox, as rank(Faun) ≮ rank(Faun ⊓ ¬⊥), since, clearly, rank(Faun ⊓ ¬⊥) = rank(Faun). Therefore, Penguin and Bird are both exceptional for K , so that rank(Bird) = ∞ and rank(Penguin) = ∞. Hence, with this notion of exceptionality, T(Bird) ⊑ ⊥ and T(Bird) ⊑ ¬Fly would be in the rational closure of TBox. Conversely, with our notion of exceptionality in Definition 19, we get that Bird is not exceptional for K , and that rank(Bird) = 0. Thus, T(Bird) ⊑ ⊥ and T(Bird) ⊑ ¬Fly are not in the rational closure of TBox (in agreement with the fact that these inclusions do not hold in all the minimal models of K ).
In conclusion, if we replace, in our definition of rational closure (Definition 20), the notion of exceptionality in Definition 19 (based on the entailment in ALC + T R ) with a different notion of exceptionality which exploits the materialization of the KB and entailment in ALC, inspired to the notions of exceptionality used in [8, 7] , the rational closure we obtain is different from the rational closure obtained based on exceptionality in Definition 19.
Rational closure over the ABox: maximizing the typicality of named individuals
In this section we extend the notion of rational closure defined in the previous one in order to take into account the individual constants in the ABox. Consider, for instance, a K with TBox = {T(Bird) ⊑ Fly} and ABox = {Bird(tweety)}. We would like to be able to conclude that Tweety flies although the ABox does not contain the information that Tweety is a typical bird. The rational closure of the TBox, in the previous section, does not say anything about the individual constants in the ABox, although its construction exploits the information in the ABox for consistency. We therefore address the question: what does the rational closure of a knowledge base K allow to infer about a specific individual constant a occurring in the ABox of K ?
The definition of rational closure of a knowledge base K considered so far only exploits the ABox (and, in particular, the typicality assertions T(C )(a) in the ABox) to determine the exceptionality of concepts and hence to build the sequence TBox 0 , TBox 1 , . . . , TBox n of subsets of TBox required to define TBox, and to reason about concept inclusions. We address the question of the ABox by first considering the semantic aspect, in order to treat individuals explicitly mentioned in the ABox in a uniform way with respect to the other domain elements: as for all the domain elements we would like to attribute to each individual constant named in the ABox the lowest possible rank. So we further refine Definition 25 by taking into account the interpretation of individual constants of the ABox: given two minimal canonical models M and M ′ , we will prefer M to M ′ if there is an individual constant b occurring in ABox such that
for all other individual constants occurring in ABox).
Definition 26 (Minimal canonical model of K minimally satisfying ABox).
Given K = (TBox, ABox), let M = , <, I and M ′ = ′ , < ′ , I ′ be two canonical models of K which are minimal with respect to Definition 25. We say that M is preferred to M ′ with respect to ABox, and we write M < ABox M ′ , if, for all individual constants a occurring in ABox, it holds that
and there is at least one individual constant b occurring in ABox such that
As a consequence of Theorem 7 we prove the following: 
2 ). And so on. Observe that the number of individual constants of ABox is finite, as well as the rank associated to each constant in each model in the chain. Hence, any descending chain of models in the relation < ABox must be finite, and a minimal canonical model minimally satisfying ABox exists. 2
In order to see the power of the above semantic notion, consider the standard birds and penguins example. Our purpose is to give an algorithmic construction that we call rational closure of the ABox, which captures entailment determined by minimal canonical models of the ABox. The idea is that of considering all the possible minimal consistent assignments of ranks to the individuals explicitly named in the ABox. Each assignment adds some properties to named individuals which can be used to infer new conclusions. We adopt a skeptical view of considering only those conclusions which hold for all assignments. The equivalence with the semantics shows that the minimal entailment captures a skeptical approach when reasoning about the ABox.
More formally, in order to calculate the rational closure of ABox, written ABox, for all individual constants of the ABox we find which is the lowest possible rank they can have in minimal canonical models with respect to Definition 25: the idea is that an individual constant a i can have a given rank k j (a i ) just in case it is compatible with all the inclusions of the TBox that do not contain the T operator or that have a T(C ) on the left side with C 's rank ≥ k j (a i ) (the inclusions whose antecedent C 's rank is < k j (a i ) do not matter since, in the minimal canonical model, there will be an instance of C with rank < k j (a i ) and therefore a i will not be a typical instance of C ). The minimal possible rank assignment k j for all a i is computed in the algorithm below: µ j i computes all the concepts that a i would need to satisfy in case it had the rank k j (a i ). for all a i ) takes into account the ranks attributed to all individual constants. Examples 13 and 14 below illustrate the use of the algorithm. Definition 27 (ABox: rational closure of ABox). Let a 1 , . . . , a m be the individuals explicitly named in the ABox. Let k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k h be all the possible rank assignments (ranging from 1 to n, for n in Proposition 14) to the individuals occurring in ABox.
• Given a rank assignment k j we define:
-TBox ∪ ABox ∪ µ j is consistent in ALC + T R ; • We say that k j is minimal and consistent with (TBox, ABox) if k j is consistent with (TBox, ABox) and there is no k i consistent with (TBox, ABox) s.t. for all a i , k i (a i ) ≤ k j (a i ) and for some b, k i (b) < k j (b).
• The rational closure of ABox (ABox) is the set of all assertions derivable in ALC + T R from TBox ∪ ABox ∪ µ j for all minimal consistent rank assignments k j , i.e.:
Before we provide soundness and completeness of the algorithm, let us illustrate its use by the two following examples. The first example is the syntactic counterpart of the semantic Example 12 above. 
The set µ 1 contains, among the others, (¬Penguin ⊔ ¬Fly)(pio), (¬Bird ⊔ Fly)(tweety). It is tedious but easy to check that K ∪ µ 1 is consistent and that k 1 is the only minimal consistent assignment (being k 1 preferred to k 2 ), thus both ¬Fly(pio) and Fly(tweety) belong to ABox. There are two minimal consistent ranks:
We have that ABox ∪ µ1 | A(joe) and ABox ∪ µ2 | C (joe). According to the skeptical definition of ABox, neither A(joe), nor C (joe) belongs to ABox, however (A ⊔ C )(joe) belongs to ABox.
We are now ready to show the completeness and soundness of the algorithm with respect to the semantic definition of rational closure of ABox. 
, while the number of
( 
Conclusions and related works
In the first part of the paper we have provided a semantic reconstruction of the well known notion of propositional rational closure. We have provided two minimal model semantics, based on the idea that preferred rational models are those in which the rank of the worlds is minimized. We have then shown that when adding suitable possibility assumptions to a knowledge base, these two minimal model semantics correspond to rational closure.
The correspondence between the proposed minimal model semantics and rational closure suggests the possibility of defining variants of rational closure by varying the three ingredients underlying our approach, namely: (i) the properties of the preference relation <: for instance just preorder, or multi-linear or weakly-connected; (ii) the comparison relation on models: based for instance on the rank of the worlds or on the inclusion between the relations <, or on a special kind of formulas satisfied by a world, as in the logic P min [19] ; (iii) the choice between fixed or variable interpretations. The systems obtained by various combinations of the three ingredients are largely unexplored and may give rise to useful nonmonotonic logics.
In the second part of the paper we have defined a rational closure construction for the Description Logic ALC extended with a typicality operator and provided a minimal model semantics for it based on the idea of minimizing the rank of objects in the domain, that is their level of "untypicality". This semantics corresponds to a natural extension to DLs of Lehmann and Magidor's notion of rational closure. We have also extended the notion of rational closure to the ABox, by providing an algorithm for computing it that is sound and complete with respect to the minimal model semantics. Last, we have shown an ExpTime upper bound for the algorithm. The work presented in this paper is an extension of the work in [22] and in [24] .
In another direction, we aim to develop a generalization of the notion of rational closure introduced in this paper and of its minimal model semantics to deal with more expressive DLs and, in particular, with DLs which do not enjoy the finite model property, such as ALCOIQ and SHOIQ, for which the notion of canonical model as introduced in this paper appears to be too strong.
As far as rational closure is concerned, it is worth noticing that rational closure for Description Logics inherits both the virtues and the weakness of propositional rational closure. We have already said about the strengths, among which there are the good computational properties. For what concerns the weaknesses, rational closure does not allow to separately reason about the inheritance of different properties. For instance, in the classical birds and penguins example, rational closure does not allow to reason in this way: penguins inherit all typical properties of birds, except those for which we know they are an exception (as the property of flying). On the contrary, once penguins are recognized as non-typical birds, no inheritance of typical properties is possible. In order to solve this problem, a strengthening of a rational closure-like algorithm with defeasible inheritance networks has been studied by [9] .
In future work, we aim to explore possible strengthening of the notion of rational closure at the semantic level, to overcome the weaknesses mentioned above. One possible direction we briefly discuss here, could be to "relativize" the notion of typicality enforced by the semantics. In order to achieve this, we aim to refine the semantics by considering models equipped with multiple preference relations, whence with multiple "typicality" operators. In this variant, it should be possible to distinguish different aspects of typicality/exceptionality and consequently to avoid the "all or nothing" behavior of rational closure with respect to property inheritance. For the time being, we just notice that in order to make this variant interesting and meaningful, one should deal with issues like: what does differentiate one preference relation from another? What are the dependencies between different preference relations? Can different preference relations or (syntactically) different typicality operators be combined? All these issues require a suitable analysis/understanding which is preliminary to the technical development. Furthermore, one should also study an algorithmic counterpart of this semantics, that is to say, a suitable reformulation of the rational closure mechanism, with the hope of keeping a reasonable complexity.
In [23, 21] nonmonotonic extensions of DLs based on the T operator have been proposed. In these extensions, the semantics of T is based on preferential logic P. Nonmonotonic inference is obtained by restricting entailment to minimal models, 22 where minimal models are those that minimize the truth of formulas of a special kind. In this work, we have presented an alternative approach. First, the semantics underlying the T is R. Moreover and more importantly, we have adopted a minimal model semantics, where, as a difference with the previous approach, the notion of minimal model is completely independent from the language and is determined only by the relational structure of models. Casini and Straccia in [8] develop a notion of rational closure for DLs. They propose a construction to compute the rational closure of an ALC knowledge base, which is not directly based on Lehmann and Magidor definition of rational closure [33] , but is similar to the construction of rational closure proposed by Freund in [14] for the propositional calculus. [8] keeps the ABox into account, and defines closure operations over individuals. It introduces a consequence relation among a knowledge base K and assertions, under the requirement that the TBox is unfoldable and the ABox is closed under completion rules, such as, for instance, that if a : ∃R.C ∈ ABox, then both aRb and b : C (for some individual constant b) must belong to the ABox, too. Under such restrictions, a procedure is defined to compute the rational closure of the ABox, assuming that the individuals explicitly named are linearly ordered, and different orders determine different sets of consequences. The authors show that, for each order s, the consequence relation s is rational and can be computed in PSpace. In a subsequent work [9, 11] , the authors introduce an approach based on the combination of rational closure and Defeasible Inheritance Networks (INs). The authors first develop their approach at a propositional level, then they extend it to DLs, addressing both TBox and ABox reasoning. The resulting construction is a nonmonotonic mechanism enjoying the logical properties of rational entailment, but not suffering from the "all-or-nothing" behavior with respect to inheritance of defeasible properties. The nonmonotonic mechanism proposed by the authors corresponds to an algorithm to compute inferences, however, as a difference with our proposal, no declarative characterization of those inferences is provided. To overcome the limitations of rational closure, in [10] Casini and Straccia also define a notion of lexicographic closure for ALC.
In [7] a semantic characterization of a variant of the notion of rational closure introduced in [8] has been presented, which is based on a generalization to ALC of our semantics in [22] . In [7] , defeasible subsumption statements have the form C < D and typicality assertions are not allowed in the ABox, which is defined as a standard ALC ABox. As we have seen, in this paper the presence of typicality assertions in the ABox may force some typicality inclusion not to hold, which is similar to allowing negated conditionals in KLM logics. While the minimal model semantics naturally deals with the presence of typicality assertions, the presence of typicality assertions in the ABox has to be taken into account, as we have done, in the definition of rational closure of the TBox and of the ABox. A further difference of our construction with those in [8, 7] is in the notion of exceptionality: our definition of exceptionality exploits preferential entailment, while [8, 7] directly use entailment in ALC over a materialization of the knowledge base. We have seen in Section 3.2 that we cannot replace entailment in ALC + T R by entailment in ALC over a materialization of the knowledge base. However, when typicality assertions are not allowed in the ABox, our notion of rational closure for TBox can be computed in ALC by defining a linear encoding of ALC + T R entailment into ALC (the encoding is exactly the same as the one provided in [26] for encoding of SHIQ R T entailment into SHIQ).
A related approach can be found in [3] . The basic idea of their semantics for the propositional case is similar to ours: to consider models of the K where the rank of each world is as small as possible. This idea has its roots in the work by Pearl [38] and by Lehmann and Magidor [33] . The construction of [3] differs from ours as the very notion of model is different (although equivalent): a model is a sequence of sets of "atoms" (conjunctions of literals for every propositional variable). Each set of the sequence represents a set of worlds with the same ranking. A unique model of the rational closure is then defined by considering all models of the K and by taking for each level, starting from the bottom one, the union of the worlds (not already considered) at that level. This construction corresponds to building a model where each world has a minimal rank. In contrast, we proceed in a different way: our semantics is defined in terms of standard Kripke models where the rank is given by the preference (or accessibility) relation, and models of the rational closure are defined as the minimal ones with respect to a comparison relation on models. Our presentation is then more abstract and declarative than the one proposed in [3] , whilst theirs is more "operational", as it relies on a specific representation of models and it provides a recipe to build a model of the rational closure, rather than a characterization of its properties.
The logic ALC + T R we consider as our base language is equivalent to the logic for defeasible subsumptions in DLs proposed by [5] . At a syntactic level the two logics differ, so that in [5] one finds the defeasible inclusions C < D instead of T(C ) ⊑ D of ALC + T R , however it has be shown in [20] that the logic of defeasible subsumption can be translated into ALC + T R by replacing C < D with T(C ) ⊑ D.
In [6] the semantics of the logic of defeasible subsumptions is strengthened by a preferential semantics. Intuitively, given a TBox, the authors first introduce a preference ordering ≪ on the class of all subsumption relations < including TBox, then they define the rational closure of TBox as the most preferred relation < with respect to ≪, i.e. such that there is no other relation < ′ such that TBox ⊆ < ′ and < ′ ≪ < . Furthermore, the authors describe an ExpTime algorithm in order to compute the rational closure of a given TBox. [6] does not address the problem of dealing with the ABox. In [36] a plug-in for the Protégé ontology editor implementing the mentioned algorithm for computing the rational closure for a TBox for OWL ontologies is described.
Recent works discuss the combination of open and closed world reasoning in DLs. In particular, formalisms have been defined for combining DLs with logic programming rules (see, for instance, [13] and [37] ). A grounded circumscription approach for DLs with local closed world capabilities has been defined in [32] .
